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Abstract
We review the notion of a classical random cipher and its advantages. We
sharpen the usual description of random ciphers to a particular mathematical
characterization suggested by the salient feature responsible for their increased
security. We describe a concrete system known as αη and show that it is
equivalent to a random cipher in which the required randomization is effected
by coherent-state quantum noise. We describe the currently known security
features of αη and similar systems, including lower bounds on the unicity dis-
tances against ciphertext-only and known-plaintext attacks. We show how αη
used in conjunction with any standard stream cipher such as AES (Advanced
Encryption Standard) provides an additional, qualitatively different layer of
security from physical encryption against known-plaintext attacks on the key.
We refute some claims in the literature that αη is equivalent to a non-random
stream cipher.
1 Introduction
The possibility of achieving greater secrecy by introducing additional randomness
into the plaintext of a cipher before encryption was known, according to [1], already
to Gauss, in the form of the so-called ‘homophonic substitution’. Such a procedure is
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an example of a random cipher [1, 2]. The advantage of a random cipher not present
in standard nonrandom ciphers is that it can provide information-theoretic security
of the key against statistical attacks, and possibly known-plaintext attacks (See Ap-
pendix A and also [2]). A somewhat detailed description of these possibilities is one
of the goals of this paper. In spite of the potential advantages of random ciphers, a
large obstacle in their deployment is the bandwidth expansion, or more accurately
data rate reduction, that is needed to operate all previous random ciphers. Also,
it is not currently possible to generate true random numbers at speeds high enough
for random ciphers to operate at sufficiently high data rates (∼ Mbps is the current
upper limit for random number generation). The quantum noise in optical coherent-
state signals may be utilized for this purpose, and quantum optical effects seem to be
the only technologically feasible way to generate > Gbps true random numbers. A
particular quantum noise-based random cipher, called αη, that also does not entail
data rate reduction, has already been proposed and implemented [3, 4] at North-
western University. In a previous preprint [2], αη was discussed concomitantly with
that of the closely related key generation system called αη-KG. Since the features
of αη direct encryption are subtle and complex enough, we take the approach in
this paper of discussing just the αη encryption system in its own right, and analyze
quantitatively its random cipher feature. Doing so will hopefully also avert many
possible confusions with αη-Key Generation, such as those in [5, 6]. In particular,
we will set up in detail the proper framework to understand and analyze the security
issues involved. Note that the present paper can be understood independently of ref.
[2], the relevant terminology and results from which are summarized in Section 2.1
and Appendix A of this paper.
Following our discussion of random ciphers in general and the αη cryptosystem,
we show that αη security is equivalent to that of a corresponding classical random
cipher. We show how quantum noise allows some degree of randomization in αη with-
out sacrificing data rate, and quantify the randomization by two different parameters
corresponding to ciphertext-only and known-plaintext attacks. We also show how
αη can be operated on top of a standard cipher like AES to provide additional, qual-
itatively different, security based on quantum noise against known-plaintext attacks
on the key. However, information-theoretically, ciphertext-only attack on the key
is possible with the original αη. We will indicate what additional techniques can
alleviate this problem, without going into any detailed analysis to be presented at
a later time. Generally, only search-complexity based security will be quantitatively
described in this paper. Finally, we rebut the claims in [5, 6] that αη security is
equivalent to that of a standard stream cipher and that αη is nonrandom.
The plan of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, we provide the necessary
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review of standard cryptography. In addition, we define the random cipher concept
quantitatively and point out the available results on random cipher security. This
sets the stage for our definitions in Section 3 that characterize a quantum cipher and
a quantum random cipher, which are both ciphers in which the ciphertext is in the
form of a quantum state. In Section 4, we describe the αη system in detail, show
its quantum random cipher characteristics, and highlight its advantages. In Section
5, we respond to the criticisms on αη made by Nishioka et al [5, 6] in a further
elaboration of the quantitative random cipher character of αη.
2 Standard Cryptography and Random Ciphers
2.1 Standard Symmetric-Key Cryptography
We review the basics of symmetric-key data encryption. Further details can be found
in, e.g., [1, 7]. Throughout the paper, random variables will be denoted by upper-case
letters such asK,X1 etc. It is sometimes necessary to consider explicitly sequences of
random variables (X1, X2, . . . , Xn). We will denote such vector random variables by
a boldface upper-case letter Xn and, whenever necessary, indicate the length of the
vector (n in this case) as a subscript. Confusion with the n-th component Xn of Xn
should not arise as the latter is a boldface vector. Particular values taken by these
random variables will be denoted by similar lower-case alphabets. Thus, particular
values taken by the key random variable K are denoted by k, k′ etc. Similarly, a
particular value of Xn can be denoted xn. The plaintext alphabet will be denoted
X , the set of possible key values K and the ciphertext alphabet Y . Thus, for example,
the sequences xn ∈ X n. In most nonrandom ciphers, X is simply the set {0, 1} and
Y = X .
With the above notations, the n-symbol long plaintext (i.e., the message sequence
that needs to be encrypted) is denoted by the random vector Xn, the ciphertext (i.e.,
the output of the encryption mechanism) is denoted byYn and the secret key used for
encryption is denoted by K. In this paper, we will often call the legitimate sender of
the message ‘Alice’, the legitimate receiver ‘Bob’, and the attacker (or eavesdropper)
‘Eve’. Note that although the secret key is typically a sequence of bits, we do not use
vector notation for it since the bits constituting the key will not need to be singled
out separately in our considerations in this paper. In standard cryptography, one
usually deals with nonrandom ciphers. These are ciphers for which the ciphertext
is a function of only the plaintext and key. In other words, there is an encyption
function Ek(·) such that:
yn = Ek(xn). (1)
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There is a corresponding decryption function Dk(·) such that:
xn = Dk(yn). (2)
In such a case, the Xi and Yi, i = 1, . . . , n are usually taken to be from the same
alphabet.
In contrast, a random cipher makes use of an additional random variable R called
the private randomizer [1], generated by Alice while encrypting the plaintext and
known only to her, if at all. Thus the ciphertext is determined as follows:
yn = Ek(xn, r). (3)
Because of the additional randomness in the ciphertext, it typically happens that
the ciphertext alphabet Y needs to be larger than the plaintext alphabet X (or else,
Y is a longer sequence than X, as in homophonic substitution). It may even be a
continuous infinite alphabet, e.g. an analog voltage value. However, we still require,
as in [1], that Bob be able to decrypt with just the ciphertext and key (i.e., without
knowing R), so that there exists a function Dk(·) such that Eq.(2) holds. We note
that random ciphers are called ‘privately randomized ciphers’ in Ref. [1] – we will
however use the shorter term ‘random cipher’ (Note that ‘random cipher’ is used in
a completely different sense by Shannon [8]).
We note that the presence or absence of the private randomizer R may be in-
dicated using the conditional Shannon entropy (We assume a basic familiarity with
Shannon entropy and conditional entropy. See any information theory textbook, e.g.,
[9].). For nonrandom ciphers, we have from Eq.(1) that
H(Yn|KXn) = 0. (4)
On the other hand, a random cipher satisfies
H(Yn|KXn) 6= 0, (5)
due to the randomness supplied by the private randomizer R. The decryption con-
dition Eqs.(2) for both random and nonrandom ciphers has the entropic characteri-
zation:
H(Xn|KYn) = 0. (6)
Note that this characterization of a random cipher is problematic when the cipher-
text alphabet is continuous, as could be the case with αη, because then the Shannon
entropy is not defined. It may be argued that the finite precision of measurement
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forces the ciphertext alphabet to be discrete. Indeed, in Sec. 2.2, we define a parame-
ter Λ that characterizes the “degree of randomness” of a random cipher. In any case,
the definition makes sense, similar to Eq. (5), only when the ciphertext alphabet is
finite, or at most discrete.
In the cryptography literature, the characterization of a general random cipher is
limited to that given by Eqs. (3) and (5). See, e.g., [1]. In the next section, we will see
that the purposes of cryptographic security suggest a sharper quantitative definition
of a random cipher involving a pertinent security parameter Γ. This new definition,
unlike (5), will be meaningful irrespective of whether the ciphertext alphabet is
discrete or continuous. Before we discuss the above new definition of random ciphers,
we conclude this section with some important cryptographic terminology.
By standard cryptography, we shall mean that Eve and Bob both observe the
same ciphertext random variable, i.e., YEn = Y
B
n = Yn. Thus, standard cryptogra-
phy includes usual mathematical private-key (and also public-key) cryptography but
excludes quantum cryptography and classical-noise cryptography [10]. For a stan-
dard cipher, random or nonrandom, one can readily prove from the above definitions
the following result known as the Shannon limit [1, 8]:
H(Xn|Yn) ≤ H(K). (7)
This result may be thought of as saying that no matter how long the plaintext
sequence is, the attacker’s uncertainty on it given the ciphertext cannot be greater
than that of the key. This condition is of crucial importance in both direct encryption
and key generation, as brought out in refs. [4, 2, 14, 16, 21], but was missed in
previous criticisms of αη [5, 6, 11].
By information-theoretic security (or IT security) on the data, we mean that Eve
cannot, even with unlimited computational power, pin down uniquely the plaintext
from the ciphertext, i.e.,
H(Xn|Yn) 6= 0. (8)
The level of such security may be quantified by H(Xn|Yn). Shannon has defined
perfect security [8] to mean that the plaintext is statistically independent of the
ciphertext, i.e.,
H(Xn|Yn) = H(Xn). (9)
With the advent of quantum cryptography, the term ‘unconditional security’ has
come to be used, unfortunately in many possible senses. By unconditional security,
we shall mean near-perfect information-theoretic security against all attacks consis-
tent with the known laws of quantum physics.
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Incidentally, note that the Shannon limit Eq. (7) immediately shows that perfect
security can be attained only if H(Xn) ≤ H(K), so that, in general, the key needs
to be as long as the plaintext.
2.2 Random Ciphers – Quantitative Definition
As mentioned in the previous section, the characterization of a general random cipher
merely using Eq. (3) or (5) is perhaps not well-motivated. The reason for studying
random ciphers is in fact the belief that they enhance the security of the cipher
against various attacks. By bringing into focus the intuitive mechanism by which a
random cipher may provide greater security than a nonrandom counterpart against
known-plaintext attacks, we will propose one possible quantitative characterization
of a general random cipher (or more exactly, a general random stream cipher. See
below.). For a description of known-plaintext and other attacks on ciphers, together
with the known results on their security, we refer the reader to Appendix A.
We now discuss the intuitive mechanism of security enhancement in a random ci-
pher. To this end, a schematic depiction of encryption and decryption with a random
cipher is given in Fig. 1. For a binary alphabet X = {0, 1}, let X n = {a1, . . . , aN}
be the set of N = 2n possible plaintext n-sequences. Let k be a particular key value.
One can view the key k as dividing the ciphertext space Yn into N parts, denoted
by the Akaj , j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, in the figure. Encryption of plaintext aj proceeds by
first determining the relevant region Akaj and randomly selecting (this is the function
of the private randomizer) as ciphertext some y ∈ Akaj . The decryption condition
Eq.(2) is satisfied by virtue of the regions Akaj being disjoint for a given k. Also
shown in Fig. 1 is the situation where a different key value k′ is used in the system.
The associated partition of Yn consists of the sets A′kaj that are shown with shaded
boundaries in Fig. 1. The important point here is that the respective partitions of
the ciphertext space for the key values k and k′ should be sufficiently ‘intermixed’.
More precisely, for any given plaintext aj , and any observed ciphertext yn, we require
that there exist sufficiently many key values k (and hence a sufficiently large prob-
ability of the set of possible keys corresponding to a given plaintext and observed
ciphertext) for which yn ∈ Akaj . In other words, a given plaintext-ciphertext pair can
be connected by many possible keys. This is the intuitive basis why random ciphers
offer better quantitative security (as measured either by Eve’s information on the
key or her complexity in finding it; see Sec. 4.2-4.4 for a discussion of αη security)
than nonrandom ciphers against known-plaintext attacks.
While the above arguments hold for any type or random cipher whatsoever, we
will restrict our scope to the so-called stream ciphers. Most ciphers in current use
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Figure 1: Schematic of a random cipher: The plaintexts ai are carried, under the
key k, into the corresponding regions Akaj of ciphertext space Y
n. The subsets of Y n
associated with a different key value k′ are shown with curved boundaries.
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(which are all nonrandom), such as AES, are stream ciphers [7]. In a nonrandom
stream cipher, the key K is first expanded using a deterministic function into a
much longer sequence (Z1, . . . , Zn) called the keystream or running key. The defining
property of a stream cipher is that the i-th ciphertext symbol yi be a function of just
the i-th keystream symbol zi and the earlier and current plaintext symbols x1, . . . , xi:
yi = E
i(x1, . . . , xi; zi). (10)
It follows that decryption of the first i symbols of plaintext is possible from the first
i symbols of ciphertext and the running key. A synchronous stream cipher is one for
which
yi = E
i(xi; zi). (11)
Thus, the i-th ciphertext symbol depends only on the i-th plaintext symbol and the
i-th keystream symbol, i.e., the cipher is memoryless. For our discussion of random
ciphers, we will restrict ourselves for concreteness to the case of random stream
ciphers, that are defined by:
yi = E
i(x1, . . . , xi; zi; ri). (12)
Here, the {Ri} are randomizers that may be assumed to be independent random
variables (this is the case in αη), but this is not necessary. In the rest of the paper,
a random cipher will always mean a random stream cipher.
For a nonrandom stream cipher given by Eq. (30), it is usually the case that
given the plaintext vector xi of length i and ciphertext symbol yi, the value of the
keystream zi is uniquely determined. This is typically the case also in a random
stream cipher when the value r taken by the randomizer Ri is known. In the absence
of such knowledge, however, the different possible values taken by Ri will in general
allow many different values of the keystream for the given plaintext vector and ci-
phertext symbol. The more such possibilities exist, the less information is obtained
about the keystream and the more ‘secure’ the cipher is. Our quantitative defini-
tion of random cipher given below introduces a parameter Γ that provides one way
of quantifying the different knowledge of the keystream obtained in the above two
scenarios by the number of additional possible keystreams for a given pair of input
data and corresponding ciphertext symbols.
Definition (Γ- Random Cipher) :
A Γ-Random Cipher is a random stream cipher of the form of Eq. (7) for which the
following condition holds:
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For every plaintext sequence, xi, for every i, for every ciphertext symbol yi obtainable
by encryption of xi, and for every value r of Ri,
|{zi|yi = Ei(x1, . . . , xi; zi; r′) for some r′}| − |{zi|yi = Ei(x1, . . . , xi; zi; r)}| ≥ Γ.
(13)
The bars | · | indicate size of the enclosed set. For a nonrandom stream cipher, the
keystream zi is uniquely fixed by the plaintext vector xi and the ciphertext symbol
yi. Therefore, if the randomizer in (13) is ignored so that it applies to a nonrandom
cipher, a nonrandom cipher would have Γ = 0. Note that the sets whose sizes appear
in the above equation, both for random ciphers and their nonrandom reductions, are
constructed only on the basis of the i-th ciphertext symbol yi, and not on the basis
of the entire ciphertext sequence. Thus, the definition of Γ only gives the number
of possible keys per symbol of ciphertext under known-plaintext attack, while the
number of possible keys based on the entire ciphertext sequence (that is illustrated
schematically by the overlap sets in Fig. 1) may be significantly less. In this sense,
our definition has a restricted symbol by symbol scope but is easy to calculate with,
similar to the independent particle approximation in many-body physics. It does not
by itself determine the precise security of the cipher, but rather is the starting point
of precise analysis, which is a difficult task just as correlations in interacting many-
body systems are always difficult to deal with in a rigorous quantitative manner.
It is possible to satisfy the random cipher condition (5) with Γ = 0. This happens,
e.g., when (13) holds for some ciphertext symbols with Γ > 0 but some others with
Γ = 0, so the overall condition (13) is only satisfied for Γ = 0. A different measure of
randomization Λ, bearing directly on (5), may be introduced which has the property
that Λ = 0 is equivalent to a nonrandom cipher. For the case where the ciphertext
alphabet is finite and for given xi, zi and r, let
Λ = |{yi|yi = Ei(x1, · · · , xi; zi; r′) for some r′}| − |{yi|yi = Ei(x1, · · · , xi; zi; r)}|.
(14)
Thus, condition (5) is equivalent to Λ > 0 for some xi, zi and r. It follows that Λ = 0
for all (xi, zi) is equivalent to the cipher being nonrandom. Λ + 1 is the number of
possible output signal symbols corresponding to a given input symbol and running
key value. Thus, the parameter Λ measures directly the degree of per symbol cipher-
text randomization, while Γ measures the per symbol key redundancy. It is possible
that a Γ = 0 random cipher is still useful due to the additional loads on Eve to
record and store more information from her observation. On the other hand, for the
typical case where zi is in one-to-one correspondence with yi for given xi and r, Γ > 0
implies Λ > 0 for every xi and zi, which in turn implies that a cipher with Γ > 0 is
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random in the sense of (5). A simple application of the Γ and Λ characterizations
to αη leads to information-theoretic lower bounds on the unicity distances n0 and
n1 for CTA and KPA, as discussed in Sec. 4.3. The following simple example also
serves to illustrate the above definitions:
Example (Random cipher)
Let X = {0, 1}, K = {k0, k1, k2, k3, k4} and Y = {a, b, c, d, e}. Fig. 2 lists the possible
ciphertexts for each plaintext and key pair.
x k y
0 k0 a, b
1 k0 c, d, e
0 k1 c, d
1 k1 e, a, b
0 k2 e, a
1 k2 b, c, d
0 k3 b, c
1 k3 d, e, a
0 k4 d, e
1 k4 a, b, c
Figure 2: Encryption table for a simple random cipher.
For this cipher, one can easily verify that at least 2 key values connect every
possible plaintext-ciphertext pair. In addition, every plaintext-key pair can lead to
at least two different ciphertexts. In terms of the definitions given above, this cipher
has Γ = 1 and Λ = 1.
3 Quantum Random Ciphers
The known and possible advantages of a random classical cipher over a nonran-
dom one were discussed in the previous section. While it is possible to implement
a random cipher classically using random numbers generated on Alice’s side, this
is not currently practical at high (∼ Gbps) rates. As will become clear in the se-
quel, the quantum encryption protocol αη (Various implementations are described
in [3, 15, 16, 17, 18] - The protocol in [18] is a variation on the original αη of [3])
effectively implements a random cipher from Eve’s point of view for a given choice
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of her measurement, the difference from a classically random cipher being that it
uses coherent-state quantum noise to perform the needed randomization. Before we
describe αη, we define some concepts that capture the relevant features of a quantum
random cipher. As emphasized in Section 2.2, we will confine our attention to stream
ciphers. First, we straightforwardly extend the usual stream cipher to one where the
ciphertext is a quantum state. Our motivation for this definition is that, from the
point of view of the legitimate users Alice and Bob, αη is a quantum stream cipher
with negligible λ in the sense given below:
Definition (λ-Quantum Stream Cipher (QSC)):
A quantum stream cipher is a cipher for which the following two conditions are
satisfied:
A. The encryption map ek(·) takes the n-symbol plaintext sequence xn to a quantum
state n-sequence ρ in the n-fold tensor product form:
ρ = ek(xn) = ρ1(x1; z1)⊗ . . .⊗ ρn(x1, . . . , xn; zn), (15)
and
B. Given the key k, there exists a measurement on the encrypted state sequence,
that recovers each plaintext symbol xi with probability Pdec > 1− λ.
Here, as in Section 2.2, (Z1, . . . , Zn) is the keystream generated from the seed
key K. A few comments will help clarify the definition. First, note that the tensor
product form of the state in condition A retains for a quantum cipher the property of
a classical cipher that one can generate the components in the n-sequence of states
that constitute the output of a cipher one after the other in a time sequence. Note
also that, analogous to a classical stream cipher, the i-th tensor component of ρ
depends on just zi and (x1, . . . , xi). Condition B is the generalized counterpart of
the decryption condition Eq.(2) for a classical cipher – we now allow a small enough
decryption error probability. Thus, the per-symbol error probability is bounded
above by λ < 1.
We now want to bring the concept of classical random cipher defined in the pre-
vious section into the quantum setting. Our motivation in doing so is to show that,
for an attacker making the same measurement on a mode-by-mode basis without
knowledge of the key, αη reduces to an equivalent Γ-Random Cipher with signifi-
cantly large Γ. Since the output of a quantum cipher is a quantum state and not a
random variable, we will need to specify a POVM {Πyn} whose measurement result
Yn supplies the classical ciphertext. Note that in this quantum situation different
11
choices of measurement may result in radically different kinds of ciphertext. Note
also that the user’s and the attacker’s measurements may be different. Our definition
of a quantum random stream cipher below will apply relative to a chosen ciphertext
Yn defined by its associated POVM. We will also assume that, from the eavesdrop-
per’s viewpoint, the same measurement is made on each of the n components of the
cipher output. In other words, the POVM defining the ciphertext Yn is a tensor
product of identical POVMs {piy}.
Definition ((Γ, λ, λ′, {piy})- Quantum Random Stream Cipher (QRC)):
An (Γ, λ, λ′, {piy}) - quantum random stream cipher is a λ-quantum stream cipher
such that for the ciphertext given by the result of the product POVM {Πyn =⊗i=n
i=1 piyi},
A. one has an Γ-random stream cipher satisfying Eq.(13), and
B. the probability of error per symbol P ′dec using the key after measurement is P
′
dec >
1− λ′.
Several comments are given to explain this definition:
1. While condition QRC-B above appears similar to the condition QSC-B for a
quantum stream cipher, there is a crucial difference. In the latter, the decryption
probability Pdec takes into account the possibility that the quantum measurement
(as well as classical post-processing) made on the cipher state can depend on
the key, i.e. it refers to Bob’s rather than Eve’s error probability. In QRC-B,
we are considering the probability of error involved for Eve when she decrypts
using a quantum measurement independent of the key followed by classical post-
processing that is , in general, “collective” and depends on the key. Thus, the
parameter λ′ is related to the symbol error probability under this latter restriction
while the parameter λ in QSC-B is tied to the symbol error probability for a
quantum measurement allowed to depend on the key. We see that there are two
measurements implicit in our definition of a QRC - one made by the user with
the help of the key, and the other given by {piy} made by the attacker without the
key. See also Item 3 below. As we shall see, αη satisfies QRC-B with negligible
λ′ under a heterodyne or phase measurement attack by Eve.
2. Γ in QRC-A, as in Eq.(13), is a measure of the ’degree of intermixing’ of the
regions of ciphertext space corresponding to different key values on a symbol-by-
symbol basis. If {piy} describes a discrete measurement, a Λ corrresponding to
Eq.(14) can also be introduced.
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3. Our stipulation that the same POVM be measured on each of the components
of the cipher output is tantamount to restricting the attacker to identical mea-
surements on each tensor component followed by collective processing. We will
call such an attack a collective attack in this paper (also in [2]). This definition
is different from the usual collective attack in quantum cryptography [19]: in the
latter, following the application of identical probes to each qubit/qumode, a joint
quantum measurement on all the probes is allowed. In our case, there is no probe
for Eve to set as we conceptually allow her a full copy of the quantum state. Doing
so, we can upper bound her performance. (This is an important feature of our
so-called KCQ approach to encryption and key generation. See [4] for discussion.)
Thus, allowing a joint measurement, as also nonidentical measurements on each
output component, will be called a joint attack.
4. In analogy with the classical random cipher definition Eq. (13), one may won-
der why the private randomizers Ri used in that definition are missing from that
of the quantum random cipher. Indeed, one may randomize the quantum state
ρi(x1, . . . , xi; zi) to ρi(x1, . . . , xi; zi; ri) using a private random variable with prob-
ability distribution pri. However, since the value of Ri remains unknown to both
user and attacker (Indeed, the user should not need to know Ri in order to de-
crypt or even to encrypt in the case of αη), one sees that all probability distri-
butions of Bob’s or Eve’s measurements in this situation are given by the state
ρ′i(x1, . . . , xi; zi) =
∑
ri
priρi(x1, . . . , xi; zi; ri), in which there is no explicit de-
pendence on ri. In particular, we mention here that exactly such quantum state
randomization, called Deliberate Signal Randomization (DSR), has been proposed
in the context of αη in [4] for the purposes of enhancing the information-theoretic
security of αη.
5. It is important to observe that the definitions given above both for classical and
quantum random ciphers are not arbitrary ones, but rather the mathematical
characterizations of very typical situations involving randomization in classical
and quantum cryptosystems.
We present an example of a QRC in the next section: the αη cryptosystem.
4 The αη cryptosystem
4.1 Operation
We now describe the αη system and its operation as a quantum cipher:
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(1) Alice and Bob share a secret key Ks.
(2) Using a key expansion function ENC(), e.g., a linear feedback shift register or
AES in stream cipher mode, the seed key Ks is expanded into a running key
sequence that is chopped into n blocks: KMn = ENC(Ks) = (K1, . . . , Kmn).
Here, m = log2(M), so that Zi ≡ (K(i−1)m+1, . . . , Kim) can take M values. The
Zi constitute the keystream.
(3) The encrypted state eKs(Xn) of Eq.(15)is defined as follows. For each bit Xi of
the plaintext sequence Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn), Alice transmits the coherent state
|ψ(Xi, Zi)〉 = |αeiθ(Xi,Zi)〉. (16)
Here, α ∈ R and θ(Xi, Zi) takes values in the set {0, pi/M, . . . , (2M − 1)pi/M}.
The function θ taking the data bit and keystream symbol to the actual angle on
the coherent state circle is called themapper. In this paper, we choose θ(Xi, Zi) =
[Zi/M + (Xi ⊕ Pol(Zi))]pi. Pol(Zi) = 0 or 1 according to whether Zi is even
or odd. This distribution of possible states is shown in Fig. 2. Thus Ki can be
thought of as choosing a ‘basis’ with the states representing bits 0 and 1 as its
end points. In general, one has the freedom to vary the mapper in various ways
for practical reasons. See, e.g, [16].
(4) In order to decrypt, Bob runs an identical ENC function on his copy of the seed
key. For each i, knowing Zi, he makes a quantum measurement to discriminate
just the two states |ψ(0, Zi)〉 and |ψ(1, Zi)〉.
To decrypt in step (4) above, Bob, in general would need a phase reference. This
is effectively provided by the use of Differential Phase Shift Keyed (DPSK) signals in
the implementations of αη. See [15, 16, 17] for details. Doing so does not compromise
security as we still assume that Eve has a perfect copy of the transmitted state.
If the line transmittance between Alice and Bob is η, Bob receives a coherent
state with energy ηS instead of S ≡ |α|2. The optimal quantum measurement [22]
for Bob has error probability
PBe ∼
1
4
exp(−4ηS). (17)
It is thus apparent that αη is a λ-quantum cipher in the sense of Section 3 with
λ ∼ 1
4
exp(−4ηS). For the S ∼ 4× 104 of [16], over a distance of 80 km at a loss of
0.2 dB/km, we have ηS ∼ 103 photons. For this mesoscopic level, λ is ∼ exp(−1000),
which is completely negligible compared, say, to the standard acceptable BER limit
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Figure 3: Left – Overall schematic of the αη encryption system. Right – Depiction
of two of M bases with interleaved logical bit mappings.
of 10−9, which arises from device imperfections, for an uncoded optical on-off keyed
line.
Let us briefly indicate how this system may provide data security by considering
an individual attack on each data bit Xi by Eve. Under such an attack, one only
looks at the per-bit error probability ignoring correlations between the bits. Under
this assumption, Eve, not knowing Zi, is faced with the problem of distinguishing
the density operators ρ0 and ρ1 where
ρb =
∑
Zi
1
M
|ψ(b, Zi)〉〈ψ(b, Zi)|. (18)
For a fixed signal energy S, Eve’s optimal error probability is numerically seen to
go asymptotically to 1/2 as the number of bases M → ∞ (See Fig. 1 of [3]). The
intuitive reason for this is that increasing M more closely interleaves the states on
the circle representing bit 0 and bit 1, making them less distinguishable. Therefore,
at least under such individual attacks on each component qumode 1 of the cipher
1When referring to an optical field mode, we use the term qumode (for ’quantum mode’, in
analogy to ’qubit’).
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output, αη offers any desired level of security determined by the relative values of
S and M . While we are not concerned in this paper with key generation, it may
be observed that unambiguous state determination (USD) attacks on αη are totally
ineffective due to the large number of 2M states involved.
In our security analysis, Eve is always assumed to be at the transmitter so that
η = 1 for her. Without knowing the key, however, her performance on the data is
still poor as described in the above paragraph. Her attacks on the key are described
in the following. We have assumed that the users can utilize the signal energy
ηS to maintain a proper bit error rate without channel coding, despite possible
interference from Eve. This does not place a stringent requirement on η itself as
one can typically go around 80 km in fiber before the signal needs to be amplified.
In case Eve’s interference is too strong and causes error, it would be detected in a
message authentication code which always goes with encryption. There is clearly no
need to do separate intrusion detection in this direct encryption case, but it turns
out there is also no need in the key generation regime [2, 4] which we do not discuss
in this paper.
4.2 αη as a Random Cipher
We showed in the previous subsection that αη may be operated in a regime of S, η
and M where it is a λ-quantum cipher for λ ∼ 0. We now show, that from Eve’s
point of view, under both a heterodyne and phase measurement attack, αη appears
effectively as a quantum random cipher according to the characterization of Section
3. Note that the randomization in αη can also be effected in principle by using
an additional classical random number generator. This is not required in αη as
high-speed randomization is automatically provided by the coherent-state quantum
noise.
To see the quantum random cipher characteristic of αη, consider employing the
following two measurements for obtaining {piy} in the quantum random cipher defi-
nition:
1) (Heterodyne measurement) piy =
1
pi
|y〉〈y|, y ∈ C.
2) (Canonical Phase measurement) piθ =
1
2pi
∑∞
n,n′=0 e
i(n−n′)θ|n〉〈n′|, θ ∈ [0, 2pi).
To show that the conditions for a QRC are satisfied, let us first consider QRC-B.
It may be shown [4] that the error probabilities λ′ involved are respectively ∼ 1
2
e−S
and ∼ 1
2
e−2S for the heterodyne and phase measurements.
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Turning to QRC-A, let us estimate the value of Γ under heterodyne and phase
measurement. For a signal energy S, the heterodyne measurement is Gaussian dis-
tributed around the transmitted amplitude with a standard deviation of 1/2 for each
quadrature while the phase measurement has an approximately Lorentzian distribu-
tion around the transmitted phase with standard deviation ∼ 1/√S. If we assume
that, given a certain transmitted amplitude/phase, the possible ciphertext values are
uniformly distributed within a standard deviation on either side and ciphertext val-
ues outside this range are not reached (this will be called the wedge approximation),
we get the following estimates Nhet and Nphase for the number of keystream values
zi covered by the quantum noise under heterodyne and phase measurements:
Nhet = 2Nphase =M/(pi
√
S). (19)
If the value of the randomizer R is fixed (corresponding to rotation by a given
angle within the wedge), Zi is fixed by the plaintext and ciphertext. Thus we have
according to Eq. (13) that
Γhet = Nhet − 1 ∼=M/(pi
√
S), (20)
and that
Γphase ∼= Γhet/2 ∼=M/(2pi
√
S). (21)
As expected, the Γ’s of both measurements increase as the number of bases M
increases, and decrease with increasing signal energy S that corresponds to decreasing
quantum noise. For example, using the experimental parameters in [16] of S ∼ 4×104
photons andM ∼ 2×103 has Γhet ∼ 3. The Λ (cf. Eq. (14) characteristics of αη will
be considered in Sec. 5.2 in connection with the Nishioka group attack. The relevance
of these parameters for security is considered in detail in the next subsection and in
Sec. 5.2.
4.3 αη: Information-theoretic and Complexity-Theoretic Se-
curity
Before discussing αη security, we comment that αη direct encryption is often com-
pared to BB84 key generation followed by the use of the generated key in either
one-time pad or a standard cipher like AES. This is not an appropriate comparison
because αη already assumes that the users share a key. Perhaps the source of the
confusion is that both αη and BB84 involve the use of quantum states. In any case,
the appropriate comparison would be between αη and a standard cipher like one-time
pad or AES - we do make such a comparison in the following.
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We will consider in turn the information-theoretic (IT) and complexity-theoretic
(CT) security of αη. In standard cryptography, no rigorous result is known about the
quantitative security level of any cipher, save the one-time pad. Since αη includes
a classical stream cipher ENC (See Fig. 1), we may in general expect a similarly
murky state of affairs regarding its quantitative security. However, it will turn out
that, under known-plaintext attacks, one can claim additional security from the
physical coherent-state noise for a suitably modified αη with any cipher ENC, as
compared to ENC alone.
4.3.1 Information-theoretic (IT) Security: Qualitative discussion
Considering first IT security, we discuss in turn qualitatively the cases of ciphertext-
only, known-plaintext, and statistical attacks on the data as well as the key. Subse-
quently, for the former two cases, we give lower bounds for the unicity distances n0
and n1 (See Appendix A for definitions).
As mentioned in Appendix A, for a nondegenerate ENC box cipher, one can
protect the key completely and attain data security up to the Shannon limit under
CTA. If the same ENC box is used in αη one may consider, as in Sec. 4.1, an
attack in which Eve attacks each data bit using only the measurement result from
the corresponding qumode. Although under such an assumption IT security obtains
as M/
√
S →∞, this attack is too restrictive since Eve does gain information on the
key from each qumode measurement that could be useful in learning about other data
bits as well. Such attacks utilizing key correlations across data bits may be launched
against standard stream ciphers. Under the wedge approximation of Sec. 4.2, Eve
is able to narrow her choice of basis down to Γ possible values. Even if Γ is large,
the key security (and hence data security) is not as good as that of the ENC box
alone for which case the keystream bits are completely random to Eve. However, one
can still derive a unicity distance lower bound (See below). This defect of αη may
be removed by the use of Deliberate Signal Randomization (DSR) introduced in [4].
However, the concrete analysis of systems using various forms of DSR are still under
progress. But see [25].
Let us now consider the case of known-plaintext attacks on the key. As discussed
in Appendix A, most nonrandom ciphers have a nondegeneracy distance nd at which
the key is fixed under a known-plaintext attack. We also mentioned that for random
ciphers, such a distance may not exist, so that it is unknown whether or not they
possess IT security against KPAs. Since αη is random, the same remark applies to
it. However, a finite unicity distance n1 may exist for αη and other random ciphers
beyond which the key is fixed in a KPA. While rigorous analysis is difficult and is
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so far limited to the unicity distance bound given below, we believe that such is the
case for the original αη with no modification, so that it has no IT security for large
enough n.
The statistical attacks fall between the above two extremes. Thus, there may exist
a crossover point where αη security becomes better than that of the ENC box alone as
one moves from CTA towards KPA. However, no quantitative results, e.g., the unicity
distance under STA, are known. To summarize, we believe that under all crypto-
graphic attacks, αη has no IT security for large enough n, i.e., limn→∞H(K|YEn ) = 0.
However, the use of αη should extend the unicity distance beyond that of the cipher
ENC used in it for some statistical attacks and for known-plaintext attacks.
4.3.2 Information-Theoretic (IT) Security: Unicity Distance Lower Bounds
Nonrigorous estimates of the unicity distance n1 against KPA for standard stream
ciphers are often made via a capacity argument in the so-called “correlation attacks”
(See, e.g., [23]). The bound
n ≥ |K|/C, (22)
where C is the capacity of Eve’s effective channel, follows from the converse to the
coding theorem [9]. The application of (22) to correlation attacks is nonrigorous
because the assumption of independent noise in each bit is not valid. In the case of
αη, rigorous lower bounds on n0 and n1 can be obtained from (22) because of the
independent qumode to qumode coherent-state noise. Under the wedge approxima-
tion to the noise distribution for evaluating Eve’s capacity in (22), it may be shown
[24] that for uniform data, the CTA unicity distance
n0 ≥ |K|
log2(
M
Λ+1
)
, (23)
and for KPA,
n1 ≥ |K|
log2(
M
Γ+1
)
. (24)
In terms of the experimental parameters of [16], this gives n0 ≥ 550, n1 ≥ 490.
While these are much bigger than n0 ∼ 120 bits for English, no precise practical
conclusion can be drawn, both because they are just lower bounds and because the
actual complexity of key determination as a function of n is not yet known. For
the numbers above, the cryptosystem would be secure if the optimal complexity is
exponential in n.
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4.3.3 Complexity-theoretic (CT) Security
Apart from IT security, the issue of complexity-theoretic (CT) security is of great
practical importance. Indeed, in [2], we have argued that large enough search com-
plexity security is as good as information-theoretic security in reality. For standard
ciphers, we have seen that there is no IT security beyond the nondegeneracy distance.
Thus, standard ciphers rely for their security under KPA basically on the complexity
of algorithms to find the key. We now compare the situation with that of αη. For any
attack, the mere fact that H(K|YEn ) = 0 (for CTA and STA) or H(K|YEnXn) = 0
(for KPA) does not mean that the unique key can be readily obtained from YEn (and
Xn in the case of KPA). For most ciphers, one needs to run an algorithm to obtain it.
At worst, this algorithm can be a brute force search - one decrypts YEn with all the
2|K| possible keys until a valid plaintext is obtained. This search can easily be made
prohibitive by choosing |K| large enough – |K| ∼ 4000 used in experimental αη [16]
is already way beyond conceivable search capability. A better procedure that we call
an assisted brute force search can exploit partial knowledge of the possible running
key values for each bit as follows. Since each basis is specified by m = log2(M) bits
of the running key, and the seed key is revealed by a |K|-bit sequence of the running
key for an ENC box of Fig. 3 that is an LFSR with known connection polynomial,
we obtain an assisted brute-force search complexity of
C = Γ|K|/m. (25)
For |K| = 4400 used in [16], C ∼ 2630 which is far beyond any conceivable search
capability. While it is not known what Eve’s optimal search complexity is, the
advantage here is that this degree of randomization is achieved automatically by the
coherent-state quantum noise at the ∼ Gbps rate of operation of the system. Note
also that it is not hard to increase M while maintaining the same data rate because
the number of bits needed to select a basis on the circle scales logarithmically with
M .
In practice, heuristic algorithms based on the structure of the ENC cipher are used
to speed up the search. The rigorous quantitative performance of these algorithms
is unknown for standard ciphers. However, one may view αη as an “enhancer” of
security by providing an additional ‘physical encryption’ on top of the standard
‘mathematical encryption’ provided by the ENC box as follows.
For the ENC of Fig. 3 used as a standard cipher, so that
Yi = Xi ⊕Ki, Ki = ENC(Ks), (26)
let the unicity distance for KPA be n1 . Let us assume that there exists an algorithm
ALG(Yn1, Xn1)) whose output is the seed key Ks and that ALG has complexity C
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when used with inputs of length n1. In order to compare this complexity with that
of αη, we assume that the same ENC is used in an αη system. However, since m
bits of the keystream output of ENC are used to choose the basis for one data bit in
αη, we first ’match’ the data stream and keystream in αη as follows.
We expand the ENC output keystream by applying m deterministic m-bit to
m-bit functions {fj}mj=1 to each keystream symbol Zi to get a new keystream Z′ as
follows:
Z ′ = (f1(Z1), · · · , fm(Z1), f1(Z2), · · · , fm(Z2), · · ·). (27)
We then use Z ′ instead of Z to choose the basis for each data bit.
The above modification results in the i-th m-block of ciphertext Y(i−1)m · · ·Yim
being dependent only on K(i−1)m · · ·Kim and X(i−1)m · · ·Xim for both ENC and αη
with ENC. Under a KPA on ENC alone, using a known plaintext of length n1,
K1 . . .Kn1 is known exactly. For ENC augmented with αη in the described manner,
it may happen that because of the randomization of Z ′1 · · ·Z ′n1, K1 . . .Kn1 is not
fixed by Yn1 and Xn1. In the latter case, we have IT security above that of ENC
alone, even though such security may be lost for large enough n, as mentioned in the
previous subsection.
Let us assume that, at the nondegeneracy distance n1 of ENC, αη with ENC does
not have IT security, so that H(K|Xn1Yn1) = 0. Assume also that n1 = mk. Even
in such a case, it appears harder to implement the algorithm ALG that finds the key.
As discussed in Section 2.2, the reason is that the randomization of the ciphertext
Yi, for each i, leaves each Zi undetermined immediately after the measurement, even
though, by our present assumption, only one possible seed key K can lead to the
observed measurement results. If the number of possibilities for each Zi is l, Eve
may need to run the algorithm ALG lk times resulting in a complexity of ln1/mC
versus C for ENC alone. Of course, there may exist a clever algorithm that enables
her to do much better. All we claim here is that αη provides an additional but
unquantified layer of security over that of the ENC box against KPA, both in the
IT and CT senses. Thus, αη can be run on top of any standard cipher in use at
present, e.g. AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), and provides an additional,
qualitatively different layer of physical encryption security over AES under a known-
plaintext attack.
An interesting point is that, if the above level of CT security against known-
plaintext attack is sufficiently high for some data length n, there is at least as much
security against CTA for the same n. However, this comparison may not be practi-
cally meaningful as a CTA can typically be launched for the entire sequence of data
while usually only a much smaller segment of known-plaintext is available to the
attacker. Typically, this would imply the attacks can be parallelized. On the other
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hand, the situation is practically favorable with AES used in the ENC - see ref. [25],
where the immunity of αη against fast correlation attacks with and without DSR are
also treated.
4.4 Overview of αη Features
We summarize the main known advantages and rigorous security claims regarding
αη compared to previous ciphers:
(1) For known-plaintext attacks on the key, αη using an LFSR has an additional
brute force search complexity given by Γ|K|/m. When reconfigured as in Sec.
4.3.3, it also has at least as much IT security as the ENC box alone for the same
length n of data.
(2) It may, when supplemented with further techniques [4], have information-theoretic
security against known-plaintext attacks that is not possible with nonrandom
ciphers, and would also have maximal information-theoretic security against
ciphertext-only attacks.
(3) With added Deliberate Signal Randomization (DSR) [4], it is expected to have
improved information-theoretic security on the data far exceeding the Shannon
limit.
(4) It has high-speed private true randomization (from quantum noise that even
Alice does not know), which is not possible otherwise with current or foreseeable
technology.
(5) It suffers no reduction in data rate compared to other known random ciphers,
because Bob needs to resolve only two and not M possibilities (i.e, one data bit
is transmitted per qumode).
(6) It provides physical encryption, different from usual mathematical encryption,
that forces the attacker to attack the optical line rather than simply the electronic
bit output.
5 Nishioka et al’s criticisms of αη
In this section, we discuss the criticisms made by Nishioka et al [5, 6] and respond to
them. This section has some overlap with [20] (that was not published), but contains
new material.
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5.1 Claims in Nishioka et al [6]
Nishioka et al claim that αη can be reduced to a classical non-random stream ci-
pher under the attack that we now review. For each transmission i, Eve makes a
heterodyne measurement on the state and collapses the outcomes to one of 2M pos-
sible values. Thus, the outcome j ∈ {0, · · · , 2M − 1} is obtained if the heterodyne
result falls in the wedge for which the phase θ ∈ [θj − pi/2M, θj + pi/2M ], where
θj = pij/M . Further, for q ∈ {0, · · · ,M − 1} representing the M possible values of
each Zi, Nishioka et al construct a function Fj(q) with the property that, for each i,
and the corresponding running key value Zi actually used,
Fj(i)(Zi) = ri (28)
with probability very close to 1. In fact, for the parameters S = 100 and M = 200,
they calculate the probability that Eq.(2) fails to hold to be 10−44, which value they
demonstrate to be negligible for any practical purpose.
The authors of [6] further claim that the above function Fj(i)(q) can always be
represented as the XOR of two bit functions Gj(i)(q) and lj(i), where lj(i) depends
only on the measurement result. Thus, they make the claim that the equation
lj(i) = ri ⊕Gj(i)(Zi) (29)
holds with probability effectively equal to 1. They then observe that a classical
additive stream cipher [7] (which is non-random by definition) satisfies
li = ri ⊕ k˜i, (30)
where ri, li, and k˜i are respectively the ith plaintext bit, ciphertext bit and running
key bit. Here, k˜i is obtained by using a seed key in a pseudo-random-number genera-
tor to generate a longer running key. The authors of [6] then argue that since lj(i) in
Eq.(29), like the li in Eq.(30), depends just on the measurement result, the validity
of Eq.(29) proves that the security of Y-00 is equivalent to that of a classical stream
cipher. In particular, they claim that by interpreting lj(i) as the ciphertext, Y-00 is
not a random cipher, i.e., it does not satisfy Eq.(5) of the next section.
We analyze and respond to these claims and other statements in [6] in the fol-
lowing section.
5.2 Reply to claims in [6]
To begin with, we believe that Eq. (2) (Eq. (14) in [6]) is correct with the probability
given by them. This content of this equation is simply that Eve is able to decrypt the
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transmitted bit from her measurement data JN and the key Ks. In other words, it
merely asserts that Eq.(2) holds for YN = JN . As such, it does not contradict, and is
even necessary, for the claim that αη is a random cipher for Eve. In fact, we already
claimed in [4] and [14] that such a condition holds. In this regard, note also that the
statement in Section 4.1 of [6] that “informational secure key generation is impossible
when ( Eq.(2) of this paper) holds” is irrelevant, since direct encryption rather than
key generation is being considered here. Furthermore, we have already pointed out
[2, 4, 14] that the Shannon limit prevents key generation with the experimental
parameters used so far, a point missed in [5, 6, 11]. See also [26].
We also agree with the claim of Nishioka et al that it is possible to find functions
lj(i) and Gj(i)(q), the former depending only of the measurement result j
(i), such that
Eq.(29) holds, again with probability effectively equal to one. The error in [6] is
to use this equation to claim, in analogy with Eq. (30), that αη is reducible to a
classical nonrandom stream cipher.
To understand the error in their argument, note that, for Eq. (30) to represent
an additive stream cipher, the li in that equation should be a function only of the
measurement result, and k˜i should be a function only of the running key. While the
former requirement is true also for the lj(i) in Eq. (29), the latter is certainly false for
the function Gj(i)(Zi) in Eq. (29), since it depends both on the measurement result
j(i) and the running key Zi. Indeed, it can be seen that the definition of the function
Fj(i)(Zi), and thus, Gj(i)(q) depends on the sets C
+
j(i)
and C−
j(i)
defined in Eq. (12)
of [6]. The identity of these sets in turn depends on the relative angle between the
basis q and Eve’s estimated basis ˜j(i) = j(i) modM. Thus, it is clearly the case that
Gj(i)(Zi) must depend both on j
(i) and Zi, a fact also revealed by the inclusion of
the subscript j(i) by the authors of [6] in the notation for G.
Notwithstanding the failure of Eq. (29) to conform to the requirements of a stream
cipher representation Eq. (30), Nishioka et al reiterate that Y-00 is nonrandom be-
cause
H(LN |RN ,Ks) = 0 (31)
holds, where LN = (lj(1), . . . , lj(N)). This equation follows from Eq. (29) and so
by considering LN ≡ YN to be the ciphertext, the Eq.(5) is not satisfied, thus
supposedly making Y-00 nonrandom. The choice of LN as the ciphertext is supported
by the statement in [6] that “It is a matter of preference what we should refer to
as “ciphertext”.” This is indeed true, especially considering that there are different
possible quantum measurements that may be made on the quantum state in Eve’s
possession, each giving rise to a different ciphertext. This point is also highlighted
by our definition of a qauntum random cipher. However, if one wants to claim
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equivalence to a non-random cipher for some particular choice of ciphertext YN ,
one must show that Eq. (10) is violated and that Eq. (11) is satisfied using the
chosen ciphertext in both equations. In other words, no equivalence to any kind of
cipher is shown unless one can also decrypt with the chosen ciphertext and key alone.
However, one may readily see that, taking YN = LN , Eq. (6) is not satisfied, i.e.,
H(RN |LN ,Ks) 6= 0. The reason is that, as we noted from our analysis above of
the function Gj(i)(q), decrypting ri requires knowledge of certain ranges in which the
angle between the basis chosen by the running key and the estimated basis ˜j(i) falls.
To convey this information for every possible j(i), one needs at least log2(2M) bits.
It follows that the single bit lj(i) is insufficient for the purpose of decryption, and
so Eq. (6) cannot be satisfied for YN = LN . Therefore, we conclude, that in the
interpretation of LN as the ciphertext, decryption is not possible even if Eve has the
key Ks. Indeed, it is JN that can be regarded as a possible ciphertext, since Eq. (6)
is satisfied for YN = JN . However, with this choice of ciphertext, Y-00 necessarily
becomes a random cipher, because H(JN |RN ,Ks) 6= 0, a fact admitted by Nishioka
et al in [6].
We hope that the discussion above makes it clear that the ‘reduction’ of αη
in [6] to a non-random cipher is false, and that in fact, no such reduction can be
made under the heterodyne attack considered in [6]. Indeed, as detailed in previous
sections, the representation of ciphertext by YN = JN does reduce it to a random
cipher under the heterodyne attack. Its quantitative random cipher characteristics,
namely Γ of Eq. (13) and Λ of Eq. (14), are as follows, for various definitions of
“ciphertext” adopted.
If the full continuous observation on the circle is taken as the ciphertext, then (20)
shows that Γ ∼ 3 for typical experimental parameters. If the ciphertext alphabet
is digitized and taken to be the 2M arc segments around the 2M states on the
circle, then αη has, for any (xi, zi, r), Λ + 1 = 2(Γ + 1) where Γ is given by (20). If
one attempts to ‘de-randomize’ the ciphertext by clubbing together the possibilities,
Γ would increase while Λ would decrease. In the nonrandom limit where a fixed
half-circle observation is taken to represent each bit value, which is the nonrandom
reduction discussed in [14], Γ would increase from that of Eq. (20) to M , making
attacks on the key completely impossible. On the other hand, while Λ = 0 for a
binary ciphertext alphabet, the 2M-outcome ciphertext would lead, from Eq. (20),
to an error probability per ciphertext bit for Eve [14]:
PEb ∼ 2/pi
√
S. (32)
Eq. (32) is obtained in the wedge approximation on a per qumode basis for Eve,
under the assumption that the state is uniformly distributed on the circle which is
25
satisfied for uniform data and an LFSR for the ENC box of Fig. 3. It leads to 0.1−1%
error rate for Eve on the ciphertext (not data [27]) for the experimental parameters
of [3, 16]. As a consequence, the data security will far exceed the Shannon limit (7)
because she would make many errors even when the correct key is given to her for
decryption. For any other ciphertext alphabet division of the circle, it is clear that
Λ > 0 for any zi and xn from the same randomization for states near the ciphertext
alphabet boundaries on the circle.
In sum, there can be no nonrandom reduction of αη. If the ciphertext alphabet is
chosen to make αη nonrandom, then known-plaintext attack on the key is impossible
and the ciphertext itself would be obtained with significant noise.
We conclude this section by responding to some other statements made in [6].
In Section 3.3, Nishioka et al claim that “The value of lj(i) does not have to be
the same as that of lj(i′) when i 6= i′, even if j(i) = j(i
′) holds.” This statement is
in direct contradiction to their previous statement in the same subsection that “lj(i)
depends only on the measurement value j(i)”.
In the same subsection, Nishioka et al claim that “In ([5]), we showed another
concrete construction of lj(i) ...”. We could find no explicit construction of lj(i) in that
paper. We were led to the choice of li described in [14] by the attempt to make the
stream cipher representation Eq. (30) valid. In fact, such a representation is claimed
by Nishioka et al in their Case 2 of [5]. It turned out, however, that decryption
using that li suffered a 0.1 − 1% error depending on the value of S used as noted
above. See [14] for further details. While it was later claimed that they have a
different reduction in mind [6], the reduction in [14] is the only one that makes αη
nonrandom (but in noise). In any case, as we have shown above, no construction
of a single-bit from the heterodyne or phase measurement results can satisfy Eq.(2)
with the extremely low probability given in [6].
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Appendix A – Security under Statistical and Known-
Plaintext Attacks
In this appendix, we summarize some relevant terminology and results from ref.
[2] on the key security of a random cipher. We first present an overview of the
various possible cryptographic attacks possible on a cipher and some early results
on the subject. We also present our result on the security of a nonrandom cipher
under known-plaintext attacks. In the process, we define the important term ‘unicity
distance’ coined by Shannon and broaden it to include the notion of ‘unicity distance
under known-plaintext attack’ for both random and nonrandom ciphers. We also
define the important concept of ‘nondegeneracy’ for both random and nonrandom
ciphers that is needed to make the concept of unicity distance meaningful. Finally, we
discuss how random ciphers may enhance security against known-plaintext attacks.
The following terminology in regard to cryptographic attacks has bee used in this
paper, as in [2]. This terminology is not standard, however. In the cryptography
literature, what we call statistical attacks are sometimes referred to as ciphertext-only
attacks (See, e.g., [7], Ch. 2) but are also often lumped together with known-plaintext
attacks.
By a ciphertext-only attack (CTA), we refer to the case where the probability
distribution p(Xn) is completely uniform, i.e., p(Xn) = 2
−n to Eve, so that her
attack cannot exploit input frequencies or correlations and must be based only on
the ciphertext in her possession. By a statistical attack (STA), we refer to the case
where the probability distribution p(Xn) is nonuniform, so that Eve may in principle
exploit input frequencies or correlations to launch a better attack. Such an attack is
typical when the plaintext is in a language such as English. It is also the attack that
obtains when the {Xi} are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) but each
p(Xi) is nonuniform. By a known-plaintext attack (KPA) we mean the case where
Eve knows exactly some length m of plaintext xm. Finally, by a chosen-plaintext
attack (CPA), we mean a KPA where the data xm is chosen by Eve.
In standard cryptography, one typically does not worry about ciphertext-only
attack on nonrandom ciphers. The reason is that, under CTA, Eq. (7) is satisfied
with equality for large n for the designed key length |K| = H(K) under a certain
‘nondegeneracy’ condition [12] that is readily satisfied. Thus, in practice, the data
security is assumed to be sufficient if H(K) is chosen large enough by adjusting the
key length. In this paper, we would essentially make the same assumption and, with
few exceptions, do not discuss data security per se. However, it follows from (7) that
no meaningful lower bound on H(Xn|Yn) exists for n ≫ |K|. A new fundamental
treatment of data security in symmetric-key ciphers has to be developed separately.
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Under CTA, it is also the case for nonrandom nondegenerate ciphers that [12]
H(K|Yn) = H(K), (33)
i.e., the key is statistically independent of the ciphertext. Thus, no attack better
than pure guessing can be launched on the key.
The above two results do not hold for statistical and known-plaintext attacks. Eve
can indeed launch an attack on the key and use her resulting information on the key
to get at future and past data. In fact, it is such attacks that are the focus of concern
for standard ciphers such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). For STAs,
Shannon [8] characterized the security by the so-called unicity distance. The unicity
distance n0 of a cipher is the smallest input data length for which H(K|Yn0) = 0.
In other words, if a plaintext sequence of length n0 is encrypted by the cipher, the
ciphertext contains enough information to fix the key (and hence, the plaintext)
uniquely – the cipher has no information-theoretic security. For nonrandom ciphers
defined by Eq. (4), Shannon, in [8], derived in terms of the data entropy an estimate
on n0 that is independent of the cipher. This estimate is actually not a rigorous
bound. Indeed, it can be shown that one of the inequalities used in the derivation
goes in the wrong direction. Even so, the estimate works well empirically for English
language plaintexts, for which n0 ∼ 25 characters are found to be sufficient to break
many ciphers.
We now consider, in some detail, security against known-plaintext attacks. Here,
a natural quantity to consider is H(K|XnYn), since it provides a measure of key
uncertainty when both plaintext and ciphertext are known to the attacker. Before
we state the main result, we define the notion of nondegeneracy distance. The reader
can readily convince himself that a finite unicity distance exists only if, for some n,
there is no redundant key use in the cryptosystem, i.e., no plaintext sequence xn is
mapped to the same ciphertext yn by more than one key value. With redundant
key use, one cannot pin down the key but it seems that this may not enhance the
system security either, and so is merely wasteful. The exact possibilities will be
analyzed elsewhere. For now, we call a cipher nondegenerate in this paper if it has
no redundant key use for some finite n or for n→∞. Under the condition
lim
n→∞
H(Yn|Xn) = H(K), (34)
which is similar but not identical to the definition of a ‘nondegenerate’ cipher given
in [12], one may show that, when Eq. (4) also holds, one has
lim
n→∞
H(K|Xn,Yn) = 0, (35)
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so that the system is asymptotically broken under a known-plaintext attack. More
generally, for a nonrandom cipher, we define a nondegeneracy distance nd to be the
smallest n such that
H(Yn|Xn) = H(K) (36)
holds, with nd = ∞ if (34) holds and there is no finite n satisfying (36). Thus, a
nonrandom cipher is nondegenerate in our sense if it has a nondegeneracy distance,
finite or infinite. In general, of course, the cipher may be degenerate, i.e., it has no
nondegeneracy distance. We can readily show (see Appendix A of [2]) that, under
known-plaintext attack, a nonrandom nondegenerate cipher is broken at data length
n = nd, in the sense that
H(K|XndYnd) = 0. (37)
More generally, for both random and nonrandom ciphers, we define the unicity
distance under known-plaintext attacks, denoted by n1, to be the smallest integer
such that
H(K|Xn1Yn1) = 0. (38)
If no such integer exists, the unicity distance under KPA is taken to be infinite if
limn→∞H(K|XnYn) = 0. Thus, n1 is the minimum length of data needed to break
the cipher for any possible known-plaintext Xn. For a nonrandom cipher, it is equal
to the nondegeneracy distance.
Many ciphers including the one-time pad and LFSRs (linear feedback shift reg-
isters [7]) have finite nd. Similar to the case of nd for nonrandom ciphers, n1 for
a random cipher may not always exist. For our definition of n1 to make sense for
random ciphers, we will impose a ‘nondegeneracy’ restriction on random ciphers: A
random cipher is said to be nondegenerate if and only if each nonrandom cipher
resulting from an assignment R = r of the randomizer is nondegenerate. Then we
say it has information-theoretic security against known-plaintext attacks if
inf
n
H(K|Xn,Yn) 6= 0, (39)
i.e., if H(K|Xn,Yn) cannot be made arbitrarily small whatever n is. In other words,
n1 does not exist. The actual level of the information-theoretic security is quantified
by the left side of (39). One major motivation to study random ciphers is the
possibility that they possess such information-theoretic security. Some discussion on
this point is also available in Appendix A of [2].
Even in the absence of information-theoretic security, nondegenerate random ci-
phers can be expected (see the discussion in Section 2.2) to have larger unicity
distance n1 under KPA compared to the case where the randomization is turned
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off. This would, as assumed in cryptography practice, increase the complexity of
attacking the key significantly. If Eq. (37) holds when Xn is replaced by a specific
xn, n defines the unicity distance corresponding to xn. The overall unicity distance
under KPA may be defined by
n¯1 = min
H(K|Xn=xn,Yn)=0
n for some xn. (40)
The above result has not been given in the literature, perhaps becauseH(K|XnYn)
has not been used previously to characterize known-plaintext attacks. Nevertheless,
it is assumed to be true in cryptography practice that K would be pinned down for
sufficiently long n in a nonrandom ‘nondegenerate’ cipher.
We now discuss the advantages that a random cipher provides as compared to
nonrandom ciphers. For the case of STA on the key when the plaintext Xn has
nonuniform but i.i.d. statistics, the so-called homophonic substitution method pro-
vides complete information-theoretic security, i.e. H(K|Yn) = H(K) [12]. The
original form of homophonic substitution involves assigning to each plaintext symbol
a number of possible sequences of length l proportional to its a priori probability in
such a way that all possible l-sequences are covered. Then, for every input symbol,
if one of its assigned l-sequences is generated at random, the net effect is to gener-
ate l-sequences of plaintext with i.i.d. uniform statistics. These sequences may be
passed through a non-degenerate cipher without revealing information on the key
as per Eq. (33). To put it another way, a statistical attack has been converted to
a ciphertext-only attack. A generalized homophonic substitution that allows each
symbol to be coded into sequences of variable length is discussed in [12], for which
it is shown that sometimes data compression instead of data expansion results.
Unfortunately, this reduction of a STA to a CTA does not work for known-
plaintext attacks. However, we emphasize that there is no result on random ciphers
analogous to Eq. (37 ) with nd replaced by any definite n depending on the cipher,
since under randomization, Eq. (4), and usually (36) also, does not hold for any
n. Indeed, an inspection of the defining equation Eq. (13) for a random cipher (or
Fig. 1) suggests how a random cipher may provide greater security against KPAs.
For a given plaintext-ciphertext sequence pair, Eq.(13) suggests that one has some
residual uncertainty on the value of the keystream (Z1, . . . , Zn), which does not exist
for a corresponding nonrandom cipher. On the other hand, Eq.(13) refers only to the
per-symbol uncertainty of the key stream calculated without regard to the ciphertext
observed for the other symbols in the sequence. When such correlations are taken
into account, the uncertainty on the keystream may be drastically reduced and we
can give no general quantitative assertions of information-theoretic security. Note,
however, that due to the randomization, the unicity distance n1 of a random cipher
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under known-plaintext attacks can be expected to be bigger than that of any of its
nonrandom reductions. Thus, the complexity-based security would be greater.
In fact, the general problem of attacking a random cipher has received limited
attention because they are not used in practice due to the associated reduction in
effective bandwidth or data rate as is evident in homophonic substitution, due to the
need for high speed random number generation, and also due to the uncertainty on
the actual input statistics needed for, e.g., homophonic substitution randomization.
Thus, the rigorous quantitative security of symmetric-key random ciphers against
known-plaintext attacks is not known theoretically or empirically, although in prin-
ciple random ciphers have actual and potential advantages just discussed.
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